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11 Introduction
The adverse selection approach to reputations is central to the study of
long-run relationships. In the ﬁnitely-repeated prisoners’ dilemma or chain-
store game, for example, the intuitive expectation that cooperation or entry
deterrence occurs in early rounds is inconsistent with equilibrium. However,
incomplete information about a player’s characteristics can be exploited to
support an equilibrium reputation for cooperating or ﬁghting entry (Kreps,
Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom
and Roberts (1982)). In inﬁnitely repeated games, the multiplicity of equi-
libria provided by the folk theorem contrasts with the intuitive attraction of
equilibria that provide relatively high payoﬀs. Reputation eﬀects can again
rescue intuition by imposing lower bounds on equilibrium payoﬀs (Fuden-
berg and Levine (1989, 1992)).
This paper explores long-run reputation eﬀects in games of imperfect
monitoring with a long-lived player facing a sequence of short-lived play-
ers. In the absence of incomplete information about the long-lived player,
her equilibrium payoﬀ can be any value between her minmax payoﬀ and an
upper bound (independent of her discount factor) strictly smaller than her
Stackelberg payoﬀ. However, when there is incomplete information about
the long-lived player’s type, reputation eﬀects imply that the equilibrium
payoﬀ of a patient long-lived player must be arbitrarily close to her Stack-
elberg payoﬀ (Fudenberg and Levine (1992)).
This powerful implication is a “short-run” reputation eﬀect, concerning
the long-lived player’s expected average payoﬀ calculated at the beginning of
the game. We show that this implication does not hold in the long run: A
long-lived player can maintain a permanent reputation for playing a com-
mitment strategy in a game with imperfect monitoring only if that strategy
plays an equilibrium of the corresponding complete-information stage game.
More precisely, the long-lived player in the incomplete-information game
is either a commitment type, who plays an exogenously speciﬁed stage-game
action, or a normal type, who maximizes payoﬀs. The actions, and hence
beliefs, of the uninformed short-lived players are public, so that the long-
lived player’s reputation is public. We show that if the commitment action
is not an equilibrium strategy for the normal type in the stage game, then in
any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information repeated game, almost
surely the short-lived players will learn the long-lived player’s type. Thus, a
long-lived player cannot indeﬁnitely maintain a reputation for behavior that
is not credible given the player’s type.
2The assumption that monitoring is imperfect is critical.2 It is straight-
forward to construct equilibria under perfect monitoring that exhibit per-
manent reputations. Any deviation from the commitment strategy reveals
the type of the deviator and triggers a switch to an undesirable equilibrium
of the resulting complete-information continuation game. In contrast, under
imperfect monitoring, any deviation by the long-lived player neither reveals
the deviator’s type nor triggers a punishment. Instead, the long-run con-
vergence of beliefs ensures that eventually any current signal of play has an
arbitrarily small eﬀect on the short-lived player’s beliefs. As a result, a long-
lived player ultimately incurs virtually no cost from a single small deviation
from the commitment strategy. But the long-run eﬀect of many such small
deviations from the commitment strategy is to drive the equilibrium to full
revelation. Reputations can thus be maintained only in the absence of an
incentive to indulge in such deviations, that is, only if the reputation is for
behavior that is part of an equilibrium of the complete-information stage
game.
The impermanence of reputation arises at the behavioral as well as at
the belief level. Asymptotically, continuation play is a Nash equilibrium of
the complete-information game. Moreover, while the explicit construction
of equilibria in reputation games is diﬃcult, we are able to provide a partial
converse (under a continuity hypothesis): for any strict Nash equilibrium of
the stage game and ε > 0, there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-
information game such that if the long-lived player is normal, then with
probability at least 1 − ε, eventually the stage-game Nash equilibrium is
played in every period.3
While the short-run properties of equilibria are interesting, we believe
that the long-run equilibrium properties are relevant in many situations. For
example, an analyst may not know the age of the relationship to which the
model is to be applied. We do sometimes observe strategic interactions from
a well-deﬁned beginning, but we also often encounter on-going interactions
whose beginnings are diﬃcult to identify. Long-run equilibrium properties
may be an important guide to behavior in the latter cases. Alternatively,
2Our results do apply to games of perfect monitoring in which the commitment type
plays a mixed strategy (see the discussion at the conclusion of Section 4.1).
3Since these results hold for any discount factor, there is an apparent tension with
Fudenberg and Levine (1992). However, the typical exercise in the reputation literature is
to ﬁx the prior probability of the commitment type, and then take the discount factor close
to one. We instead ﬁx both the prior and the discount factor (which may be close to one,
given the prior), and examine long-run equilibrium behavior. The posterior probability of
the commitment type eventually becomes small given the discount factor.
3one might take the view of a social planner who is concerned with the con-
tinuation payoﬀs of the long-run player and with the fate of all short-run
players, even those in the distant future. Our analysis also suggests that the
short-run players may have deﬁnite preferences as to where they appear in
the queue of short-run players, oﬀering a new perspective on the incentives
created by repeated games. Finally, interest often centers on the steady
states of models with incomplete information, again directing attention to
long-run properties.
We view our results as suggesting that a model of long-run reputations
should incorporate some mechanism by which the uncertainty about types
is continually replenished. For example, Holmstr¨ om (1999), Cole, Dow, and
English (1995), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), and Phelan (2001) assume
that the type of the long-lived player is governed by a stochastic process
rather than being determined once and for all at the beginning of the game.
In such a situation, reputations can indeed have long-run implications.
The next section uses a simple motivating example to place our contri-
bution in the literature. Section 3 describes our model. Section 4 presents
the statements of the theorems, with the main result proven in Section 5.
For expositional clarity, most of the paper considers a long-lived player, who
can be one of two possible types—a commitment type who always plays the
same (possibly mixed) stage-game action and a normal type—facing a se-
quence of short-lived players whose actions are perfectly observed. Section
6 provides conditions under which our results continue to hold when there
are many possible commitment types, when these commitment types play
more complicated strategies, when the uninformed player is long-lived, and
when the short-run player’s actions are not observed.
2 Related Literature
Consider an inﬁnitely-lived player 1 with discount factor δ playing a
simultaneous-move stage game with a succession of short-lived player 2’s







and has a unique Nash equilibrium, BR, which is strict.
Player 1’s action in any period is not observed by any player 2. There
4is, however, a public signal of player 1’s action, that takes on two possible
values, y0 and y00, according to the distribution
Pr{ y = y0 | i } =

p, if i = T,
q, if i = B,
where p > q. Player 2’s actions are public. Player 1’s payoﬀs are as in
the above stage game (1), and player 2’s ex post payoﬀs (i.e., payoﬀs as a
function of the realized public signal and his own action) are given by
L R
y0 3(1 − q)/(p − q) (1 − 2q + p)/(p − q)
y00 −3q/(p − q) (−2q + p)/(p − q)
.
Expected payoﬀs for player 2 are thus still given by (1). This structure of
ex post payoﬀs ensures that the information content of the public signal is
identical to that of player 2’s payoﬀs.
This game is an example of what Fudenberg and Levine (1994) call a
moral hazard mixing game. Even for large δ, the long-run player’s max-
imum Nash (or, equivalently, sequential) equilibrium payoﬀ is lower than
when monitoring is perfect (Fudenberg and Levine (1994, Theorem 6.1, part
(iii))).4 For our example, it is straightforward to apply the methodology of
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) to show that if 2p > 1 + q, the set of








Moreover, if 2δ (p − q) > 1, there is a continuum of particularly simple equi-
libria, with player 1 placing equal probability on T and on B in every period,
irrespective of history, and with player 2’s strategy having one period mem-
ory. Player 2 plays L with probability α0 after signal y0 and with probability
α00 after signal y00, with




The maximum payoﬀ of 2 − (1 − p)/(p − q) is obtained by setting α0 = 1.
We introduce incomplete information by assuming there is a probability
p0 > 0 that player 1 is the Stackelberg type who plays T in every period.
4In other words, the folk theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) does not
hold when there are short-lived players.
5Fudenberg and Levine (1992) show that for any payoﬀ u < 2, there is δ
suﬃciently close to 1 such that in every Nash equilibrium, the expected
average discounted payoﬀ to player 1 is at least u. We emphasize that u
can exceed the upper bound in (2), so that the normal player 2 does strictly
better in every equilibrium of the incomplete-information game than the
best complete-information equilibrium.5
Our result is that the eﬀect of the incomplete information about player
1, including the lower bounds placed on payoﬀs illustrated in this example,
is temporary. To develop intuition, consider a Markov perfect equilibrium,
with player 2’s belief that player 1 is the Stackelberg type (i.e., player 1’s
“reputation”) being the natural state variable. In any such equilibrium, the
normal type cannot play T for sure in any period: if she did, the posterior
after any signal in that period equals the prior, and hence continuation play
is independent of the signal. But then player 1 has no incentive to play T.
Thus, in any period of a Markov perfect equilibrium, player 1 must put pos-
itive probability on B. Consequently, the signals are continually informative
about player 1’s type, and so almost surely, when player 1 is normal, beliefs
converge to zero probability on the Stackelberg type.6 Our analysis exploits
this intuition, but we do not restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria
and we generalize the result to more complicated commitment types.
While some of our arguments and results are reminiscent of the recent
literature on rational learning and merging, there are important diﬀerences.
For example, Jordan (1991) studies the asymptotic behavior of “Bayesian
strategy processes,” in which myopic players play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot game in each period, players initially do not know the payoﬀs
of their opponents, and players observe past play. The central result is
that play converges to a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information stage
game. In contrast, the player with private information in our game is long-
lived and potentially very patient, introducing intertemporal considerations
that do not appear in Jordan’s model, while the information processing in
our model is complicated by the imperfect monitoring.
A key idea in our results (in particular, Lemma 1) is that if signals are
statistically informative about a player’s behavior, then nontrivial beliefs
about that players’s type can persist only if diﬀerent types asymptotically
5For any u < 5/2, if the commitment type is a mixed commitment type, playing T
with a probability less than but suﬃciently close to 1/2 and δ is suﬃciently close to one,
then every Nash equilibrium average discounted payoﬀ for player 1 must be at least u.
6Benabou and Laroque (1992) study the Markov perfect equilibrium of a game with
similar properties. They show that player 1 eventually reveals her type in any Markov
perfect equilibrium.
6play identically. Similar ideas play an important role in merging arguments
(e.g., Sorin (1999)), which provide conditions under which a stochastic pro-
cess and beliefs over that process converge. Kalai and Lehrer (1995) use
merging to provide a simple argument that in reputation games, asymptotic
continuation play is a subjective correlated equilibrium of the complete-
information game. This result is immediate in our context, since we begin
with a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game (in contrast to
the weaker assumptions of Kalai and Lehrer (1995)).
Jackson and Kalai (1999) prove that if a ﬁnitely repeated normal-form
game with incomplete information (for which Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
prove a reputation folk theorem) is itself repeated, with new players in each
repetition, then eventually, reputations cannot aﬀect play in the ﬁnitely
repeated game. While they reach a similar conclusion, the model is quite
diﬀerent. In particular, players in one round of the ﬁnitely repeated game
do not internalize the eﬀects of their behavior on beliefs and so behavior
of players in future rounds, and there is perfect monitoring of actions in
each stage game. We exploit the imperfection of the monitoring to show
that reputations are eventually dissipated even when players recognize their
long-run incentives to preserve these reputations.
3 The Model
3.1 The Complete-Information Game
The stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move ﬁnite game of public mon-
itoring. Player 1 chooses an action i ∈ {1,2,...,I} ≡ I and player 2 simulta-
neously chooses an action j ∈ {1,2,...,J} ≡ J. The public signal, denoted
y, is drawn from a ﬁnite set, Y . The probability that y is realized under the
action proﬁle (i,j) is given by ρ
y
ij. The ex post stage-game payoﬀ to player 1
from the action proﬁle (i,j) and signal y is given by f1(i,j,y). The ex ante





post stage-game payoﬀ to player 2 from the action j and signal y is given by





The stage game is inﬁnitely repeated. Player 1 (“she”) is a long-lived
(equivalently, long-run) player with discount factor δ < 1. Her payoﬀs in the
inﬁnite horizon game are the average discounted sum of stage-game payoﬀs,
(1−δ)
P∞
t=0 δtπ1(it,jt). The role of player 2 (“he”) is played by a sequence
of short-lived (or short-run) players, each of whom only plays once.
The actions of player 2 are public, while player 1’s actions are pri-
vate. Player 1 in period t has a private history, consisting of the public
7signals and all past actions, denoted by h1t ≡ ((i0,j0,y0),(i1,j1,y1),...,
(it−1,jt−1,yt−1)) ∈ H1t ≡ (I × J × Y )
t. Let {H1t}∞
t=0 denote the ﬁltration
on (I ×J ×Y )∞ induced by the private histories of player 1. The public his-
tory, observed by both players, is the sequence ((j0,y0),(j1,y1),...,(jt−1,yt−1))
∈ (J×Y )t. Let {Ht}∞
t=0 denote the ﬁltration induced by the public histories.
We assume the public signals have full support (Assumption 1), so ev-
ery signal y is possible after any action proﬁle. We also assume that with
suﬃcient observations player 2 can correctly identify, from the frequencies
of the signals, any ﬁxed stage-game action of player 1 (Assumption 2).
Assumption 1 (Full Support): ρ
y
ij > 0 for all (i,j) ∈ I × J and y ∈ Y .
Assumption 2 (Identification): For all j ∈ J, the I columns in the
matrix (ρ
y
ij)y∈Y,i∈I are linearly independent.
A behavior strategy for player 1 is a map σ1 : ∪∞
t=0H1t → ∆I, from
the set of private histories of lengths t = 0,1,... to the set of distributions
over current actions. Similarly, a behavior strategy for player 2 is a map
σ2 : ∪∞
t=0Ht → ∆J.
A strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ2) induces a probability distribution Pσ over
(I × J × Y )
∞. Let Eσ[·|H`t] denote player `’s expectations with respect to
this distribution conditional on H`t, where H2t = Ht.7
In equilibrium, the short-run player plays a best response after every
equilibrium history. Player 2’s strategy σ2 is a best response to σ1 if, for all
t,
Eσ[ π2(it,jt) | Ht] ≥ Eσ[ π2(it,j) | Ht], ∀j ∈ J Pσ-a.s.
Denote the set of such best responses by BR(σ1).
The deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium is completed by the requirement
that player 1’s strategy maximizes her expected utility:
Definition 1: A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game is a





















The assumption of full-support monitoring ensures that all ﬁnite se-
quences of public signals occur with positive probability, and hence must be
7This expectation is well-deﬁned, since I, J, and Y are ﬁnite.
8followed by optimal behavior in any Nash equilibrium. The only public out-
of-equilibrium events are those in which player 2 deviates. Since player 2 is
a short-run player, he can never beneﬁt from such a choice. Consequently,
any Nash equilibrium outcome is also the outcome of a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
3.2 The Incomplete-Information Game
At time t = −1 a type of player 1 is selected. With probability 1−p0 > 0 she
is the “normal” type, denoted by n, with the preferences described above.
With probability p0 > 0 she is a “commitment” type, denoted by c, who
plays the same (possibly mixed) action ς1 ∈ ∆I in each period independent
of history.8 We assume:
Assumption 3: Player 2 has a unique best reply to ς1 (denoted ς2) and
ς ≡ (ς1,ς2) is not a stage-game Nash equilibrium.
Denote by ˆ σ1 the repeated-game strategy of playing ς1 ∈ ∆I in each
period independent of history. Since ς2 is the unique best response to ς1,
BR(ˆ σ1) is the singleton {ˆ σ2}, where ˆ σ2 is the strategy of playing ς2 in each
period independent of history. Since ς is not a stage game Nash equilib-
rium, (ˆ σ1, ˆ σ2) is not a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information inﬁnite
horizon game.
The example from Section 2 illustrates the role of the assumption that
player 2 have a unique best response. The strategy that places equal prob-
ability on T and B (while not part of an equilibrium of the stage game)
is part of many equilibria of the complete-information game (as long as
δ > 1/[2(p − q)]), and consequently the normal type can have a permanent
reputation for playing like that commitment type. On the other hand, player
2 has a unique best response to any mixture in which player 1 randomizes
with probability of T strictly larger than 1
2, and a strategy that always plays
such a mixture is not part of any equilibrium of the complete-information
game.
A state of the world is now a type for player 1 and sequence of actions
and signals. The set of states is Ω = {n,c} × (I × J × Y )
∞. The prior
p0, commitment strategy ˆ σ1 and the strategy proﬁle of the normal players
˜ σ = (˜ σ1,σ2) induce a probability measure P over Ω, which describes how
8When we are interested in “Stackelberg” commitment types, and the attendant lower
bounds on player 1’s ex ante payoﬀs, it suﬃces to consider commitment types who follow
such simple strategies when player 2 is a short-run type. More complicated commitment
types are discussed in Section 6.2.
9an uninformed player expects play to evolve. The strategy proﬁle ˆ σ =
(ˆ σ1,σ2) (respectively, ˜ σ = (˜ σ1,σ2)) determines a probability measure ˆ P
(resp., ˜ P) over Ω, which describes how play evolves when player 1 is the
commitment (resp., normal) type. Since ˜ P and ˆ P are absolutely continuous
with respect to P, any statement that holds P-almost surely, also holds ˜ P-
and ˆ P-almost surely. Henceforth, we will use E[·] to denote unconditional
expectations taken with respect to the measure P. ˜ E[·] and ˆ E[·] are used to
denote conditional expectations taken with respect to the measures ˜ P and ˆ P.
Generic outcomes are denoted by ω. The ﬁltrations {H1t}∞
t=0 and {Ht}∞
t=0
on (I × J × Y )
∞ can also be viewed as ﬁltrations on Ω in the obvious way;
we use the same notation for these ﬁltrations (the relevant sample space will
be obvious).
For any repeated-game behavior strategy σ1 : ∪∞
t=0H1t → ∆I, denote
by σ1t the tth period behavior strategy, so that σ1 can be viewed as the
sequence of functions (σ10,σ11,σ12,...) with σ1t : H1t → ∆I. We extend
σ1t from H1t to Ω in the obvious way , so that σ1t (ω) ≡ σ1t(h1t(ω)), where
h1t(ω) is player 1’s t-period history under ω. A similar comment applies to
σ2.
Given the strategy σ2, the normal type has the same objective func-
tion as in the complete-information game. Player 2, on the other hand, is
maximizing E[ π2(it,j) | Ht], so that after any history ht, he is updating
his beliefs over the type of player 1 that he is facing. The proﬁle (˜ σ1,σ2)
is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game if each player is
playing a best response.
At any equilibrium, player 2’s posterior belief in period t that player
1 is the commitment type is given by the Ht-measurable random variable
pt : Ω → [0,1]. By Assumption 1, Bayes’ rule determines this posterior after
all sequences of signals. Thus, in period t, player 2 is maximizing
ptπ2(ς1,j) + (1 − pt) ˜ E[ π2(it,j) | Ht]
P-almost surely. At any Nash equilibrium of this game, the belief pt is a
bounded martingale with respect to the ﬁltration {Ht}t and measure P.9 It
therefore converges P-almost surely (and hence ˜ P- and ˆ P-almost surely) to
a random variable p∞ deﬁned on Ω. Furthermore, at any equilibrium the
posterior pt is a ˆ P-submartingale and a ˜ P-supermartingale with respect to
the ﬁltration {Ht}t.
A ﬁnal word on notation: The expression ˜ E [σ1t|Hs] is the standard
conditional expectation, viewed as a Hs-measurable random variable on Ω,
9These properties are well-known. Proofs for the model with perfect monitoring (which
carry over to imperfect monitoring) can be found in Cripps and Thomas (1995).
10while ˜ E [σ1 (h1t)|hs] is the conditional expected value of σ1 (h1t) (with h1t




Our main result is:
Theorem 1: Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions
1 and 2, and the commitment action ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 3. In any Nash
equilibrium of the game with incomplete information, pt → 0 ˜ P-almost
surely.
The intuition is straightforward: Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium of
the incomplete-information game in which both the normal and the commit-
ment type receive positive probability in the limit (on a positive probability
set of histories). On this set of histories, player 2 cannot distinguish between
signals generated by the two types (otherwise player 2 could ascertain which
type he is facing), and hence must believe that the normal and commitment
types are playing the same strategies on average. But then player 2 must
play a best response to the commitment type. Since the commitment type’s
behavior is not a best reply for the normal type (to this player-2 behavior),
player 1 must eventually ﬁnd it optimal to not play the commitment-type
strategy, contradicting player 2’s beliefs. The proof is in Section 5.
As we noted in the Introduction, our argument makes critical use of the
assumption of full-support imperfect monitoring. However, if monitoring is
perfect and the commitment type plays a mixed strategy, the game eﬀec-
tively has imperfect monitoring (as Fudenberg and Levine (1992) observe).
For example, in the perfect monitoring version of the game described in Sec-
tion 2 (so that player 1’s action choice is public), if the commitment type
randomizes with probability 3/4 on T, then the realized action choice is a
noisy signal of the commitment type. Theorem 1 immediately applies to
the perfect monitoring case, as long as the commitment type plays a mixed
strategy with full support.
4.2 Asymptotic Equilibrium Play
Given Theorem 1, we should expect continuation play to converge to a Nash
equilibrium of the complete-information game. Our next theorem conﬁrms
11this result.
We use the term continuation game for the game with initial period in
period t, ignoring the period t histories. We use the notation t0 = 0,1,2,...
for a period of play in a continuation game (which may be the original game)
and t for the time elapsed prior to the start of the continuation game. A
pure strategy for player 1, s1, is a sequence of maps s1t0 : H1t0 → I for
t0 = 0,1,.... Thus, s1t0 ∈ IH1t0 and s1 ∈ I∪t0H1t0 ≡ S1, and similarly
s2 ∈ S2 ≡ J∪t0Ht0. The spaces S1 and S2 are countable products of ﬁnite
sets. We equip each space S`, ` = 1,2, with the σ-algebra generated by the
cylinder sets, denoted by S`. The players’ payoﬀs in the inﬁnitely repeated
game (as a function of pure strategies) are given by







The expectation above is taken over the action pairs (it0,jt0). These are
random, given the pure strategy proﬁle (s1,s2), because the pure action
played in period t depends upon the random public signals.
For ` = 1,2, let M` denote the space of probability measures µ` on
(S`,S`). We say a sequence of measures µn
1 ∈ M1 converges to µ1 ∈ M1 if,
for each τ, we have
(3) µn
1|I(I×J×Y )τ → µ1|I(I×J×Y )τ
and a sequence of measures µn
2 ∈ M2 converges to µ2 ∈ M2 if, for each τ,
we have
(4) µn
2|J(J×Y )τ → µ2|J(J×Y )τ .
Moreover, each M` is sequentially compact in the topology of this conver-
gence. Payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 are extended to M = M1 × M2 in the
obvious way. Since player 1’s payoﬀs are discounted, the inherited product
topology is strong enough to guarantee continuity of u1 : M →R. Each
player 2’s payoﬀ is trivially continuous.
Fix an equilibrium of the incomplete-information game. If the normal
type of player 1 observes a private history h1t ∈ H1t, her strategy ˜ σ1 speciﬁes
a behavior strategy in the continuation game. This behavior strategy is
realization equivalent to a mixed strategy ˜ µ
h1t
1 ∈ M1 for the continuation
game. For a given public history, ht, there are many possible such mixed
strategies that the normal type could be playing. We let ˜ µht
1 denote the
12expected value of ˜ µ
h1t
1 , conditional on the public history ht. From the point
of view of player 2, who observes only the public history, ˜ µht
1 is the strategy
of the normal player 1 following history ht. We let µht
2 ∈ M2 denote player
2’s mixed strategy in the continuation game.
If we had metrized M, a natural formalization of the idea that asymp-
totically the normal type and player 2 are playing a Nash equilibrium is
that the distance between the set of Nash equilibria and the induced dis-
tributions (˜ µht
1 ,µht
2 ) goes to zero. While M is metrizable, a simpler and
equivalent formulation is that the limit of every convergent subsequence of
(˜ µht
1 ,µht
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium.10 Section A.1 proves:
Theorem 2: Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions
1 and 2, and the commitment action ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 3. For any
Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game and for ˜ P-almost all
sequences of histories {ht}t, every cluster point of the sequence of continua-
tion proﬁles {(˜ µht
1 ,µht
2 )}t is a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information
game with normal player 1.
Suppose the Stackelberg payoﬀ is not a Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the
complete-information game. Recall that Fudenberg and Levine (1992) pro-
vide a lower bound on equilibrium payoﬀs in the incomplete-information
game of the following type: Fix the prior probability of the Stackelberg
(commitment) type. Then, there is a value for the discount factor, ¯ δ, such
that if δ > ¯ δ, then in every Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player’s ex ante
payoﬀ is essentially no less than the Stackelberg payoﬀ. The reconciliation of
this result with Theorem 2 lies in the order of quantiﬁers: while Fudenberg
and Levine ﬁx the prior, p0, and then select ¯ δ (p0) large (with ¯ δ (p0) → 1
as p0 → 0), we ﬁx δ and examine asymptotic play, so that eventually pt is
suﬃciently small that ¯ δ (pt) > δ.
4.3 Asymptotic Restrictions on Behavior
This section provides a partial converse to Theorem 2. We identify a class
of equilibria of the complete-information game to which (under a continu-
ity hypothesis) equilibrium play of the incomplete-information game can
converge.11 The proof is in Section A.2.
10This equivalence is an implication of the sequential compactness of M, since every




2 ) has a convergent sub-subsequence.
11We conjecture this hypothesis is redundant, given the other conditions of the theorem,
but have not been able to prove it.
13Recall that in the example of Section 2, the stage game has a (unique)
strict Nash equilibrium BR. It is a straightforward implication of Fudenberg
and Levine (1992) that the presence of the commitment type ensures that,
as long as player 1 is suﬃciently patient, every equilibrium in this example
begins with a long sequence of play close to TL. On the other hand, an im-
plication of Theorem 3 below is that for the same parameters (in particular,
the same prior probability of the commitment type), there is an equilibrium
in which, with arbitrarily high probability under ˜ P, BR is eventually played
in every period.
The construction of such an equilibrium must address the following two
issues. First, as we just observed, reputation eﬀects may ensure that for
a long period of time, equilibrium play will be very diﬀerent from BR.
Theorem 3 is consistent with this, since it only claims that in the equilibrium
of interest, BR is eventually played in every period with high probability.
Second, even if reputation eﬀects are not currently operative (because the
current belief that player 1 is the commitment type is low), with positive
probability (albeit small), a sequence of signals will arise that increases the
posterior that player 1 is the commitment type and hence makes reputation
eﬀects a recurring possibility.
Theorem 3: Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions
1 and 2, and the commitment action ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 3. Suppose the
stage game has a strict Nash equilibrium, (i∗,j∗). Suppose that for all ε > 0,
there exists η and an equilibrium of the complete-information game, σ(0),
such that for all p0 ∈ (0,η), the game with incomplete-information with
prior p0 has an equilibrium whose payoﬀ to player 1 is within ε of u1(σ(0)).
Given any prior p0 and any δ, for all ε > 0, there exists a Nash equilibrium
of the incomplete-information game in which the ˜ P-probability of the event
that eventually (i∗,j∗) is played in every period is at least 1 − ε.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
5.1 Player 2’s Posterior Beliefs
The ﬁrst step is to show that either player 2’s expectation (given the public
history) of the strategy played by the normal type is in the limit identical to
the strategy played by the commitment type, or player 2’s posterior prob-
ability that player 1 is the commitment type converges to zero (given that
player 1 is indeed normal).
This is an extension of a familiar merging-style argument to the case of
14imperfect monitoring. If the distributions generating player 2’s observations
are diﬀerent for the normal and commitment types, then he will be updating
his posterior, continuing to do so as the posterior approaches zero. His
posterior converges to something strictly positive only if the distributions
generating these observations are in the limit identical. In the statement
of the following Lemma, h1t is to be interpreted as a function from Ω to
(I × Y )
t.






ς1 − ˜ E[ ˜ σ1t | Ht ]
 
 = 0, P-a.s.
Proof: Let pt+1(ht;jt,yt) denote player 2’s belief in period t + 1 after
playing jt in period t, observing the signal yt in period t, and given the
history ht. By Bayes’ rule,
pt+1(ht;jt,yt) =
pt Pr[yt | ht,jt,c]
pt Pr[yt | ht,jt,c] + (1 − pt)Pr[yt | ht,jt,n]
.


















































Denote the summation on the left by A and note that A < maxi ρ
yt
ijt < 1.
Repeating the derivation of (6) for 1 − pt+1, the probability that player 1





































12We use kxk to denote the sup-norm on R
I.























Since pt is a P-almost sure convergent sequence, it is Cauchy P-almost
surely.13 So the right hand side of (7) converges to zero P-almost surely.
Thus, for any y,


















Hence, if both types are given positive probability in the limit then the
frequency that any signal is observed is identical under the two types.
We now show that (8) implies (5). Let Πjt be a |Y | × |I| matrix whose
yth row, for each signal y ∈ Y , contains the terms ρ
y
ijt for i = 1,...,|I|.
Then as (8) holds for all y (and Y is ﬁnite), it can be restated as




ς1 − ˜ E[˜ σ1t|Ht]

  → 0, P-a.s.,
where k.k is the supremum norm. By Assumption 2, the matrices Πjt have
I linearly independent columns for all jt, so x = 0 is the unique solution
to Πjtx = 0 in RI. In addition, there exists a strictly positive constant
b = infj∈J,x6=0 kΠjxk/kxk. Hence kΠjxk ≥ bkxk for all x ∈ RI and all j ∈ J.





ς1 − ˜ E[˜ σ1t|Ht]

 
≥ pt(1 − pt)b
 
ς1 − ˜ E[˜ σ1t|Ht]
 
 → 0, P-a.s.,
which implies (5). Q.E.D.
Condition (5) says that either player 2’s best prediction of the normal
type’s behavior is eventually identical to the commitment type’s behavior
(that is, k ς1 − ˜ E[ ˜ σ1t | Ht ] k → 0 P-almost surely), or the type is revealed
13Note that the analysis is now global, rather than local, in that we treat all the expres-
sions as functions on Ω.
16(that is, p∞(1 − p∞) = 0 P-almost surely). However, p∞ < 1 ˜ P-almost
surely, and hence (5) implies a simple corollary:14






 ς1 − ˜ E[ ˜ σ1t | Ht ]

  = 0, ˜ P-a.s.
5.2 Beliefs about Player 2’s Beliefs
Corollary 1 implies that if pt 6→ 0 on a set of states with positive measure,
then (on this set of states) player 2 must think that the normal type’s
strategy is arbitrarily close to that of the commitment type. Since player 1
is better informed than player 2, player 1 must know that player 2 believes
this:
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. Suppose there exists
A ⊂ Ω such that ˜ P(A) > 0 and p∞(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ A. Then, for
suﬃciently small η > 0, there exists F ⊂ A with ˜ P(F) > 0 such that, for
any ξ > 0, there exists T for which














< ξ, ∀t > T














where the convergence is uniform on F.
Proof: Deﬁne the event Dη = {ω ∈ A : p∞(ω) > 2η}. Because the set
A on which p∞(ω) > 0 has ˜ P-positive measure, for any η > 0 suﬃciently
small, we have ˜ P(Dη) > 2µ, for some µ > 0. On the set of states Dη the
random variable kς1 − ˜ E[˜ σ1t|Ht]k tends ˜ P-almost surely to zero (by Lemma
14Since the odds ratio pt/(1−pt) is a ˜ P-martingale, p0/(1−p0) = ˜ E[pt/(1−pt)] for all
t. The left side of this equality is ﬁnite, so limpt < 1 ˜ P-almost surely.
171). Therefore, on Dη the random variable Zt = sups≥t kς1 − ˜ E[˜ σ1s|Hs]k
converges ˜ P-almost surely to zero and hence (Hart (1985, Lemma 4.24))
(13) ˜ E[ Zt | Ht ] → 0 ˜ P − almost surely.
Egorov’s Theorem (Chung (1974, p.74)) then implies that there exists F ⊂
Dη such that ˜ P(F) ≥ µ on which the convergence of pt and ˜ E[Zt|Ht] is uni-
form. Hence, for any ξ > 0, there exists a time T such that the inequalities
in (10) and (11) hold everywhere on F for all t > T.
Fix ψ > 0. Then, for all ξ0 > 0, (11) holds for ξ = ξ0ψ, which implies
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5.3 Completion of the Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by showing that, on a subset of the
states F in Lemma 2, player 2 believes he should be playing a best response
to the commitment strategy. The normal type of player 1 will best respond
to this player-2 best response with high probability, ensuring that the nor-
mal and commitment types of player 1 play diﬀerently, contradicting the
assumption that pt 6→ 0 on F.
Deﬁne β ≡ mini{ςi
1 : ςi
1 > 0} and γ ≡ miny,i,j ρ
y
ij, where the latter is
strictly positive by Assumption 1. Since ς1 is not a best reply for the normal
type to ς2 (the myopic best reply to ς1), there exists η > 0 such that for any
repeated-game strategy for player 2 that attaches probability at least 1 − η
to ˆ σ2 (i.e., to always playing ς2), ς1 is suboptimal for the normal type in
period 1.
As ς2 is the unique best response to ς1, it is strict and so there exists
ψ > 0 such that ς2 is the unique best response to any action of player 1, ς0
1,
satisfying kς0
1 − ς1k < ψ.
Suppose that there is a positive ˜ P-probability set of outcomes A on which
p∞ > 0. Choose ξ,ζ such that ζ < βγ and ξ < min{ψ,β − ζγ}. By (12),
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 ς1 − ˜ E[˜ σ1t|Ht]
 
 < ξ ˜ P a.s.
Set
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= ˜ E[ gt | Ht ]
= ˜ E [gt | gt ≤ 1 − η,Ht](1 − κt) + ˜ E [gt | gt > 1 − η,Ht]κt
≤ (1 − η)(1 − κt) + κt. (16)
Combining the inequalities (14) and (16) we get that for almost every state
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> 1 − ζ,
and so player 2 assigns a probability of at least 1 − ζ to player 1 believing
with probability at least 1 − η that player 2 believes player 1’s strategy is
within ξ of the commitment strategy.
Since ξ < ψ, player 2 plays ς2, the unique best response to the com-
mitment action, whenever he believes that 1’s strategy is within ξ of the
commitment strategy. Hence, in any period t > T, player 2 assigns a prob-
ability of at least 1−ζ to player 1 believing that player 2’s subsequent play
is ˆ σ2 with at least probability 1 − η. Thus, player 2 assigns probability at
least 1 − ζ to player 1’s subsequent play being a best response to player 2’s
best response to ˆ σ1. But η was chosen so that there is then an action in
the support of ˆ σ1, say i0, that is not optimal in period t. Player 2 must
accordingly believe that i0 is played with a probability of no more than ζ in
period t. But since β − ζ > ξ, this contradicts (15). Q.E.D.
6 Extensions
6.1 Many Commitment Types
To extend the preceding analysis to the case in which there are many com-
mitment types, let T be a set of possible commitment types. The com-
mitment type c plays the repeated-game strategy ˆ σc
1 that plays the ﬁxed
19stage-game action ςc
1 ∈ ∆I in each period. We assume T is either ﬁnite or
countably inﬁnite, and ςc
1 6= ςc0
1 for all c 6= c0 ∈ T . At time t = −1 a type
of player 1 is selected. With probability pc
0 > 0, she is commitment type c,
and with probability pn
0 = 1 −
P
c∈T pc
0 > 0 she is the “normal” type. A
state of the world is, as before, a type for player 1 and sequence of actions
and signals. The set of states is then Ω = T ×(I × J × Y )
∞. We denote by
ˆ Pc the probability measure induced on Ω by the commitment type c ∈ T ,
and as usual, we denote by ˜ P the probability measure on Ω induced by the
normal type. Finally, we denote by pc
t player 2’s period t belief that player
1 is the commitment type c.
To deal with many types of player 1, we ﬁrst argue that it is impossible
for two diﬀerent commitment types to be given positive probability in the
limit.
Lemma 3: At any Nash equilibrium of a game satisfying Assumptions 1 and
2, for all c 6= c0 ∈ T ,
pc
tpc0
t → 0 P−a.s.
Proof: Derive (6) for each of the types c and c0. Take the diﬀerence of




Theorem 4: Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. Let T ∗ be the set





2) not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Then in
any Nash equilibrium, pc
t → 0 for all c ∈ T ∗ ˜ P-almost surely.
The proof duplicates that of Theorem 1, with the following change. Fix






the unconditional measure on Ω implied by the normal type and all the
commitment types other than c0. The only point at which it is important
that ˜ P is indeed the measure induced by the normal type is at the end of
the proof, when the normal type has a proﬁtable deviation that contradicts
player 2’s beliefs. We now apply Lemma 3. Since we are arguing on a ˜ P-
positive probability subset where pc0
t is not converging to zero, every other
commitment type is receiving little weight in 2’s beliefs. Consequently, from
player 2’s point of view, eventually the measures P−c0
and ˜ P are suﬃciently
close to obtain the same contradiction.
206.2 Complicated Commitment Types
We have followed the common practice of considering simple commitment
types who repeat a ﬁxed stage-game mixture in each period. The results
extend to commitment types whose strategies are not stationary, as long as
their behavior is eventually incompatible with equilibrium.
Definition 2: The strategy ¯ σ1 is never an equilibrium strategy in the long
run, if there exists ¯ T and ε > 0 such that, for every ¯ σ2 ∈ BR(¯ σ1) and for
























A strategy σ1 is simple if it plays the same stage-game (possibly mixed)
action after every history. A strategy σ1 is public if it is measurable with
respect to {Ht}t, so that the mixture over actions in each period depends
only upon the public history. A strategy σ1 is publicly implementable by a
ﬁnite automaton if there exists a ﬁnite set W, an action function d : W →
∆I, a transition function ϕ : W × Y → W, and an initial element w0 ∈ W,
such that σ1 (ht) = d(w(ht)), where w(ht) is the state reached from w0
under the public history ht and transition rule ϕ.
It is straightforward to show that if a simple strategy plays the stage-
game mixture ς ∈ ∆I, to which player 2 has a unique best response, then the
strategy is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run if and only if ς is
not part of a stage-game Nash equilibrium. Similarly, suppose ¯ σ1 is publicly
implementable by the ﬁnite automaton (W,d,ϕ,w0), with every state in W
reachable from every other state in W under ϕ. If player 2 has a unique
best reply to d(w) for all w ∈ W, then ¯ σ1 is never an equilibrium strategy
in the long run if and only if ¯ σ1 is not part of a Nash equilibrium of the
complete-information game.15
Theorem 5: Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose ˆ σ1 is a
public strategy with ﬁnite range (i.e., ∪htˆ σ1 (ht) is ﬁnite) that is never an
15The only if direction of this statement is obvious. So, suppose ¯ σ1 is not a Nash
equilibrium of the complete-information game. Since player 2 always has a unique best
reply to d(w), σ2 is public, and can also be represented as a ﬁnite-state automaton, with
the same set of states and transition function as ¯ σ1. Since ¯ σ1 is not a Nash equilibrium,
there is some state w
0 ∈ W, and some action i
0 not in the support of d(w
0) such that when
the state is w
0, playing i
0 and then following ¯ σ1 yields a payoﬀ that is strictly higher than
following ¯ σ1 at w
0. Since the probability of reaching w
0 from any other state is strictly
positive (and so bounded away from zero), ¯ σ1 is never an equilibrium in the long run.
21equilibrium strategy in the long run. In any Nash equilibrium of any game
with incomplete information, pt → 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
Proof: Since ˆ σ1 is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run, there
exists ¯ T such that after any positive probability history of length at least
¯ T, ˆ σ1 is not a best response to any strategy σ2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1) of player 2 that
best responds to ˆ σ1. Indeed, there exists η > 0 such that this remains true
for any strategy of player 2 that attaches probability at least 1 − η to any
strategy in BR(ˆ σ1).
The argument in Section 5.3 now applies, with the following three changes:
First, redeﬁne β as β ≡ mini,ht{ˆ σi
1 (ht) : ˆ σi
1 (ht) > 0} (which is strictly pos-
itive, since ˆ σ1 has ﬁnite range). Second, T must be larger than ¯ T. Third,
the last two paragraphs of that section are replaced by the following:
We now argue that there is a period t ≥ T and an outcome in F such that
ˆ σ1 is not optimal for the normal player 1 in period t. Given any outcome
ω ∈ F and a period t ≥ T, let ht be its t-period public history. There is
a K > 0 such that for any t large, there is a public history yt,...,yt+k,
0 ≤ k ≤ K, under which ˆ σ1(ht,yt,...,yt+k) puts positive probability on
a suboptimal action. (Otherwise, no deviation can increase the period-t
expected continuation payoﬀ by at least ε.) Moreover, by full support,
any K sequence of signals has probability at least λ > 0. If the public
history (ht,yt,...,yt+k) is consistent with an outcome in F, then we are
done. So, suppose there is no such outcome. That is, for every t ≥ T,
there is no outcome in F for which ˆ σ1 attaches positive probability to a
suboptimal action within the next K periods. Letting Ct(F) denote the
t-period cylinder set of F, ˜ P(F) ≤ ˜ P(Ct+K(F)) ≤ (1 − λ) ˜ P (Ct (F)) (since
the public history of signals that leads to a suboptimal action has probability
at least λ). Proceeding recursively from T, we have ˜ P(F) ≤ ˜ P(CT+`K(F)) ≤
(1 − λ)
` ˜ P (CT (F)), and letting ` → ∞, we have ˜ P (F) = 0, a contradiction.
Hence, there is a period t ≥ T and an outcome in F such that one of the
actions in the support of ˆ σ1, i0 say, is not optimal in period t. That is, any
best response assigns zero probability to i0 in period t. From (17), player
2’s beliefs give a probability of at least 1 − ζ to a strategy of player 1 that
best responds to 2’s best response to ˆ σ1, which means that player 2 believes
that i0 is played with a probability of no more than ζ. But since β − ζ > ξ,
this contradicts (15). Q.E.D.
6.3 Two Long-Lived Players
We now extend the analysis to the case of a long-lived player 2. The second
and third paragraphs of Section 5.3 are the only places where the assump-
22tion that player 2 is short-lived makes an appearance. When player 2 is
short-lived, player 2 is myopically best responding to the current play of
player 1, and so as long as player 2 is suﬃciently conﬁdent that he is facing
the commitment type, he will best respond to the commitment type. On
the other hand, if player 2 is long-lived, like player 1, then there is no guar-
antee that this is still true. For example, player 2 may ﬁnd experimentation
proﬁtable. Nonetheless, reputation eﬀects can still be present (Celentani,
Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer (1996)).
The following result (proven in the Appendix) shows that if the com-
mitment type and the normal type are behaving suﬃciently similarly, then
player 2 will be playing a best response to the commitment type for arbitrar-
ily many periods. (The notation (W,d,ϕ,w0) is described above Theorem
5.)
Lemma 4: Suppose ˆ σ1 is publicly implementable by the ﬁnite automaton
(W,d,ϕ,w0), and BR(ˆ σ1;w0) is the set of best replies for player 2 to (W,d,ϕ,w0).
For any history ht, let w(ht) ∈ W be the state reached from w0 under the
public history consistent with ht. Let (˜ σ1,σ2) be Nash equilibrium strate-
gies in the incomplete-information game where player 2 is long-lived with





2(ht) > κ. Then, then for all T > 0 there exists ψ > 0 such that if






  ˆ E[ˆ σ1s|Hs] − ˜ E[˜ σ1s|Hs]






> 1 − ψ,
then for some σ0
2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1;w(ht)), the continuation strategy of σ2 after the
history ht agrees with σ0
2 for the next T periods.
If player 2’s posterior that player 1 is the commitment type fails to
converge to zero on a set of states of positive ˜ P-measure, then the same
argument as in Lemma 2 shows that (18) holds (note that (11) in Lemma 2
uses ˜ P rather than P to evaluate the probability of the event of interest).
With this result in hand, the proof of Theorem 1 goes through as before,
establishing:
Theorem 6: Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose ˆ σ1 is pub-
licly implementable by a ﬁnite automaton and is never an equilibrium strat-
egy in the long run. Let (˜ σ1,σ2) be Nash equilibrium strategies in the
incomplete-information game where player 2 is long-lived with discount fac-
tor δ2 ∈ [0,1). Suppose ∃κ > 0 such that for all ht, if σ
j
2(ht) > 0 then
σ
j
2(ht) > κ. Then, pt → 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
236.4 Private Actions
Our results continue to hold when player 2’s actions are private, as long
as player 1 can infer player 2’s posterior belief pt from the public signals.16










for all y ∈ Y , i,i0 ∈ I, and j,j0 ∈ J. This holds, for example, if the public
signal y is a vector (y1,y2) ∈ Y1 × Y2 = Y , with y1 a signal of player 1’s
action and y2 an independent signal of player 2’s action. In this case, action









The full-support Assumption 1 is replaced by the requirement that, for all




Assumption 2, in the presence of (19), is equivalent to the requirement that




Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2003) addresses the case where player
2’s actions are not known to player 1 and his posterior depends upon his
actions as well as the public signals. In this case, the long-lived player’s
reputation is private, since the public signals do not allow player 1 to infer
2’s posterior beliefs. This complicates the analysis, since it is now harder
to show that the convergence of player 2’s beliefs implies that the normal
player 1 knows she has a proﬁtable deviation from the commitment strategy.
In the course of coping with the potential uninformativeness of the public
signals, we extend the results to the case of purely private monitoring.
Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis,
MO 63130-4899; cripps@olin.wustl.edu;
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk,
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297; gmailath@econ.upenn.edu;
and
Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory
Drive, Madison, WI 53706-1320; LarrySam@ssc.wisc.edu.
16Indeed, each player 2’s action choices can be completely private, so that future player
2’s do not learn the choice of the active player 2.
24A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: At the given equilibrium, the normal type is playing in an optimal
way from time t onwards given her (private) information. Thus, for each












The subscripts on the expectation operator are the measures on (s1,s2).











Player 2 is also playing optimally from time t onwards given the public
information, which implies that for all s0

















1 is the play of the commitment type. Since player 2 is a short-run
player, this inequality is undiscounted and holds for all t0.
From Theorem 1, pt → 0 ˜ P-almost surely. Suppose {ht}t is a sequence
of public histories with pt → 0, and suppose {(˜ µht
1 ,µht
2 )}∞
t=1 → (˜ µ∗
1,µ∗
2) on
this sequence. We need to show that (˜ µ∗
1,µ∗
2) satisﬁes (A.1) and (A.2) (the
latter for all t0 > 0). It suﬃces that the expectations E(µ1,µ2)[u1(s1,s2)]
and E(µ1,µ2)[u2(s1,s2)] are continuous in (µ1,µ2). The continuity required
is established in the proof of Theorem 4.4 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We begin by focusing on games that are “close” to the complete-information
game. All the Lemmas assume the hypotheses of Theorem 3.
Lemma A: For all T, there exists ˆ η > 0 such that for all p0 ∈ (0,ˆ η), there is
a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game in which the normal
type plays i∗ and player 2 plays j∗ for the ﬁrst T periods, irrespective of
history.
Proof: Let ε0 = 1
2 [π1 (i∗,j∗) − maxi6=i∗ π1(i,j∗)] > 0. By assumption,
there exists η > 0 and a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game,
25σ (0), such that for each belief p ∈ (0,η), there is a Nash equilibrium of the
incomplete-information game, σ (p), satisfying |Epu1 (σ (p)) − E0u1 (σ (0))| <
ε0
2 , where Ep denotes taking expectations with probability p on the commit-
ment type. Hence, for p,p0 < η,

Epu1 (σ (p)) − Ep0u1 (σ (p0))

 < ε0.
Since j∗ is player 2’s strict best response to i∗, there exists η0 > 0 so
that for all pt < η0, j∗ is still a best response to the normal type playing i∗.
For any T there exists ˆ η > 0 so that if p0 < ˆ η, then pt < min{η,η0} in all
periods t ≤ T, by Assumption 1. The equilibrium strategy proﬁle is to play
(i∗,j∗) for the ﬁrst T periods (ignoring history), and then play according
to the strategy proﬁle identiﬁed in the previous paragraph for the belief pT,
σ (pT). By construction, no player has an incentive to deviate and so the
proﬁle is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
While, for T large, the equilibrium just constructed yields payoﬀs to
player 1 that are close to π1(i∗,j∗), the equilibrium guarantees nothing about
asymptotic play. The equilibrium of the next Lemma does.
Lemma B: For all ε > 0, there exists η∗ > 0 such that for all p0 ∈ (0,η∗],
there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game, σ∗∗(p0), in
which the ˜ P-probability of the event that (i∗,j∗) is played in every period
is at least 1 − ε.
Proof: Fix ζ = 1
3 [π1 (i∗,j∗) − maxi6=i∗ π1(i,j∗)] > 0, and choose T large
enough so that δTM <
ζ
2 (recall that M is an upper bound for stage game
payoﬀs) and that the average discounted payoﬀ to player 1 from T periods
of (i∗,j∗) is within
ζ
2 of π1 (i∗,j∗). Denote by ˆ η the upper bound on beliefs
given in Lemma A. For any prior p ∈ (0,ˆ η) that player 1 is the commitment
type, let σ∗(p) denote the equilibrium of Lemma A. By construction, σ∗(p)
yields player 1 an expected payoﬀ within ζ of π1 (i∗,j∗).
There exists η00 < ˆ η such that if pt < η00, then the posterior after T peri-
ods, pt+T(pt), is necessarily below ˆ η. Consider the following strategy proﬁle,
consisting of two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, play (i∗,j∗) for T periods, ignor-
ing history. In the second phase, behavior depends on the posterior beliefs
of player 2, pt+T(pt). If pt+T(pt) > η00, play σ∗(pt+T(pt)). If pt+T(pt) ≤ η00,
begin the ﬁrst phase again.
By construction, the continuation payoﬀs at the end of the ﬁrst phase
are all within ζ of π1(i∗,j∗), and so for any prior satisfying p0 < η00, the
strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium.
Fix p0, and let p
†
t be the beliefs of player 2 under the strategy proﬁle
in which (i∗,j∗) is played in every period, irrespective of history. It is
26immediate that p
†
t → 0 P†-almost surely (where P† is the measure implied by
(i∗,j∗) in every period), and so supt0≥t p
†
t0 → 0 P†-almost surely. Moreover,
if p
†
τ ≤ η00 for all τ ≤ t, then p
†
τ = pτ for all τ ≤ t. By Egorov’s Theorem,
there exists a t∗ such that P†{supt0≥t∗ p
†
t0 ≤ η00} > 1 − ε. But then for some
public history, ht∗, P†{supt0≥t∗ p
†
t0 ≤ η00|ht∗} > 1 − ε. The monotonicity of
p
†
t as a function of p0 implies that, for some η∗ > 0, if p0 < η∗, p
†
t ≤ η00
for all t ≤ t∗. Moreover, the set {supt0≥t∗ p
†
t0 ≤ η00} cannot shrink as p0 is
reduced, and so P†{supt p
†
t ≤ η00} > 1 − ε. Hence, for p0 < η∗, ˜ P{supt pt ≤
η00} = P†{supt p
†
t ≤ η00} > 1 − ε. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3:
We ﬁrst construct an equilibrium of an artiﬁcial game, and then argue that
this equilibrium induces an equilibrium with the desired properties in the
original game.
Fix ε and the corresponding η∗ from Lemma B. In the artiﬁcial game,
player 2 has the action space J × {g,e} × [0,1], where we interpret g as
“go,” e as “end,” and p ∈ [0,1] as an announcement of the posterior belief
of player 2. The game is over immediately when player 2 chooses e. The
payoﬀs for player 2 when player 2 ends the game with the announcement of
p depend on the actions as well as on the type of player 1 (recall that n is
the normal type and c is the commitment type):
π∗
2 (i,j,e,p;n) = π2 (i,j) + η∗ − p2
and
π∗
2 (i,j,e,p;c) = π2 (i,j) − (1 − η∗) − (1 − p)
2 ,
where η∗ > 0 is from Lemma B. The payoﬀs for player 2 while the game
continues are:
π∗
2 (i,j,g,p;n) = π2 (i,j) − p2
and
π∗
2 (i,j,e,p;c) = π2 (i,j) − (1 − p)
2 .
The payoﬀs for the normal type of player 1 from the outcome {(is,js,g,ps)}
∞
s=0
(note that player 2 has always chosen g) are as before (in particular, the be-
















where u1(σ∗∗ (pt)) is player 1’s equilibrium payoﬀ under σ∗∗(pt) from Lemma
B.
Since player 2 chooses an announcement p ∈ [0,1] to minimize (1−pt)p2+
pt(1 − p)2, he always ﬁnds it strictly optimal to announce his posterior.
Moreover, again by construction, player 2 ends the game if and only if his
posterior is less than η∗. Moreover, the artiﬁcial game has an equilibrium
(σ∗
1,σ∗
2) (by Fudenberg and Levine (1983, Theorem 6.1)).
The desired equilibrium in the original game is given by (σ∗
1,σ∗
2), with
the modiﬁcation that should (σ∗
1,σ∗
2) call for player 2 to announce e, then
play proceeds according to the equilibrium speciﬁed in Lemma B for the
corresponding value of ρ (< η∗). It follows from Lemma B that this is an
equilibrium of the original game. It then follows from Theorem 1 that ˜ P-
almost surely, the probability of the event that (i∗,j∗) is played eventually
is at least 1 − ε. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: Fix T > 0. Since W is ﬁnite, it is enough to argue that for each
w ∈ W, there is ψw > 0 such that if player 2 observes a history ht so that













> 1 − ψw,
then for some σ0
2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1;w), the continuation strategy of σ2 after the
history ht agrees with σ0
2 for the next T periods.
Fix a public history, h0
t. Let ˆ σ1 (hs) denote the play of the ﬁnite au-
tomaton (W,d,ϕ,w(h0
t)) after the public history hs, where h0
t is the initial
segment of hs. Since player 2 is discounting, there exists T0 such for any





 ˆ σ1 (hs) − ˜ E [˜ σ1s|hs]

  < εw,
then for some σ0
2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1;w(h0
t)), the continuation strategy of σ2 after the
history h0
t agrees with σ0
2 for the next T periods.
28By assumption, ∃κ > 0 such that if σ
j
2(ht) > 0 then σ
j
2(ht) > κ. Recall
that γ ≡ miny,ij ρ
y




. Suppose (A.3) holds
with this ψw. We claim that (A.4) holds for s = t,...,t + T0 and for all hs
with initial segment h0
t. Suppose not. The assumption on σ2 implies that
the probability of the continuation history hs, conditional on the history h0
t,







  ˆ E[ˆ σ1s|Hs] − ˜ E[˜ σ1s|Hs]







contradicting (A.3), since (κγ)T0
> ψw. Q.E.D.
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